When President Donald Trump imposed sweeping new tariffs on imported goods on April 2 – upending global trade and sending markets into a tailspin – he presented the move as a response to a crisis. In an executive order released the same day, the White House said the move was necessary to address “the national emergency posed by the large and persistent trade deficit.”
A trade deficit – when a country imports more than it exports – is often viewed as a problem. And yes, the U.S. trade deficit is both large and persistent. Yet, I maintain that far from a national emergency, this persistent deficit is actually a sign of America’s financial and technological dominance.
A trade deficit sounds bad, but it is neither good nor bad.
It doesn’t mean the U.S. is losing money. It simply means foreigners are sending the U.S. more goods than the U.S. is sending them. America is getting more cheap goods, and in return, it is giving foreigners financial assets: dollars issued by the Federal Reserve, bonds from the U.S. government and American corporations, and stocks in newly created firms.
That is, a trade deficit can only arise if foreigners invest more in the U.S. than Americans invest abroad. In other words, a country can only have a trade deficit if it also has an equally sized investment surplus. The U.S. is able to sustain a large trade deficit because so many foreigners are eager to invest here.
Why? One major reason is the safety of the U.S. dollar. Around the world, from large corporations to ordinary households, the dollar is used for saving, trading and settling debts. As the world economy grows, so does foreigners’ demand for dollars and dollar-denominated assets, from cash to Treasury bills and corporate bonds.
Because the dollar is so attractive, the Federal Reserve gets to mint extra cash for use abroad, and the U.S. government and American employers and families can borrow money at lower interest rates. Foreigners eagerly buy these U.S. financial assets, which enables Americans to consume and invest more than they ordinarily could. In return for our financial assets, we buy more German machines, Scotch whiskey, Chinese smartphones, Mexican steel and so on.
Another reason for foreigners’ steady demand for U.S. assets is American technological dominance: When aspiring entrepreneurs from around the world start new companies, they often decide to do so in Silicon Valley. Foreigners want to buy stocks and bonds in these new companies, again adding to the U.S. investment surplus.
This strong demand for U.S. assets also explains why Trump’s last trade war in 2018 did little to close the trade deficit. Tariffs, by themselves, do nothing to reduce foreigners’ demand for U.S. dollars, stocks and bonds. If the investment surplus doesn’t change, the trade deficit cannot change. Instead, the U.S. dollar just appreciates, so that imports get cheaper, undoing the effect of the tariff on the size of the trade deficit. This is basic economics. You can’t have an investment surplus and a trade surplus at the same time, which is why it’s silly to call for both.
It’s worth noting that no other country in the world enjoys a similarly sized investment surplus. If a normal country with a normal currency tries to print more money or issues more debt, its currency depreciates until its investment account – and its trade balance – goes back to something close to zero. America’s financial and technological dominance allows it to escape this dynamic.
The president’s frenzied attacks on the nation’s trade deficit show he’s misreading a sign of American economic strength as a weakness. If the president really wants to eliminate the trade deficit, his best option is to rein in the federal budget deficit, which would naturally reduce capital inflows by raising domestic savings.
Rather than reviving U.S. manufacturing, Trump’s extreme tariffs and erratic foreign policy are likely to instead scare off foreign investors altogether and undercut the dollar’s global role. That would indeed shrink the trade deficit – but only by eroding the very pillars of the country’s economic dominance, at a steep cost to American firms and families.
Tarek Alexander Hassan is a professor of economics at Boston University. Distributed by The Conversation and The Associated Press.
