Marking the first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration announced another round of sanctions “to further degrade Russia’s economy and diminish its ability to wage war against Ukraine.” Yet, extensive trade and financial sanctions imposed by the U.S. and its allies have not deterred Russia. Are sanctions effective at all?
The earliest example of economic sanctions – the Megarian decree – dates back to ancient Greece in 432 B.C. To penalize Megarians for trespassing the sacred meadow, General Pericles of Athens imposed a trade blockade and banned them from using Athenian harbors. Fast forward to 1806, Napoleon imposed a continental blockade against British trade. And more recently, the U.S. imposed economic sanctions on the former USSR, Cuba, South Africa, North Korea, Iraq, Iran and Venezuela with a mixed record of success.
Proponents of sanctions argue that restricting trade could trigger popular discontent in the targeted country and put pressure on the government to reverse some foreign policies. Apartheid-era South Africa is a good example. In the 1980s, economic, cultural and military embargoes imposed on South Africa by a broad multilateral coalition eventually led to the collapse of the apartheid regime. In 2010, the Obama administration’s sanctions on Iran, in collaboration with the European Union, opened doors to negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program.
As a reasonable option between inaction and a military conflict, sanctions are also used by politicians to demonstrate toughness domestically to their constituents. The public may demand them, too. Human rights activists in the U.S. have asked for sanctions against China for treatment of Uyghurs and Tibetans, against Hungary for democratic backsliding and against Israel for its treatment of Palestinians.
Opponents argue that trade sanctions rarely work and could be counterproductive. About sanctions’ efficacy, there are a variety of estimates ranging from 5% to 33% and one can always point to some spectacular failures of economic sanctions. Decadeslong sanctions against Cuba have yet to topple the regime there. A broad set of sanctions against Russia since 2014 did not deter President Vladimir Putin from invading Ukraine last year and the Russian policy is even more aggressive today. Recent trade and technological sanctions against China have not generated any substantial concessions, either.
On the contrary, sanctions may generate unintended consequences. For example, in response to the Western sanctions in 2014, Russia has initiated the “Fortress Russia” campaign to improve self-sufficiency and become less vulnerable to outside pressure. Russian countersanctions aimed at imported Western food products have benefited domestic farmers and reduced the share of Russian food imports from 33% to 2%. In 2015, the Russian agriculture minister said, “We are thankful to our European and American partners, who made us look at agriculture from a new angle and helped us find new reserves and potential.”
Although intended to punish ruling elites, sanctions often impart more costs on ordinary people. The trade embargo in the 1990s against Saddam’s Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait contributed toward 500,000 infant mortalities in Iraq while having no impact on Saddam.
Sanctions may even inflict self-harm. President Thomas Jefferson’s Embargo Act of 1807, against Britain and France for harassing American ships, hurt the U.S. economy more than the target nations. Later in the early 1940s, the U.S. oil embargo on Japan triggered the Pearl Harbor attack. Finally, the Western embargo on Russian oil and gas in 2022 is cited as a driver of higher inflation, which imposed significant costs on American consumers.
As part of an economic statecraft strategy, sanctions are most effective when imposed by a broad multilateral coalition against a target nation that has a strong middle class independent from the state. Sanctions work better in the long run for containment purposes rather than inducing changes of behaviors. It is also important that policymakers set specific goals to achieve with the sanctions and their effectiveness should be assessed periodically.
As a tool in the foreign policy arsenal, sanctions should be used sparingly and smartly. Otherwise, they carry the risk of alienating allies, hurting average citizens rather than the elites and shifting global trade away from the U.S. dollar.
Koray Özpolat is a professor of supply chain management at the University of Rhode Island and a graduate student of political science at URI.
